Judgments of moral wrongdoing and affective competencies

Both in the context of those who focus on judgments of moral wrongdoing via a contrast with other types of normative violations (e.g. the contrast between moral wrongs like killing an innocent person and conventional wrongs like violating an etiquette rule) and in the context of those who focus on judgments of moral wrongdoing simply, there is an ongoing debate concerning the role of affective competencies in shaping these judgments. On the one hand, some claim that feelings play a fundamental causal role, and some even claim that such judgments reflect nothing more than feelings. On the other hand, some claim that feelings are only fundamental to some of these judgments, and some even claim that feelings are incidental to all such judgments. Our aim is to shed new light on this debate in both contexts.  We are developing
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