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(29/05/2012) Concurso para bolseiro de investigação no projeto "Judgments of Moral Wrongdoings and Emotion: A Neuropsychophysiological Study" do Porto X-Phi Lab/Call for applications for research assistant position in the project "Judgments of Moral Wrongdoings and Emotion: A Neuropsychophysiological Study", at the Porto X-Phi Lab (Portuguese)
There is an ongoing debate concerning whether ordinary intuitions are incompabilitist, namely, whether folk conceptions of free action, including mental actions such as decisions, and moral responsibility imply the falsity of determinism. Some have claimed that ordinary intuitions are incompatibilist; others that on the contrary they are compatibilist. The former have argued that compatibilist intuitions are a result of performance biases clouding the expression of folk conceptions; the latter have argued that ordinary intuitions are incompatilist only regarding fatalism or mechanism, not determinism. Thus, the debate is rather about which types of broad metaphysical assumptions might be incompatible with folk conceptions of free action and moral responsibility. Our aim is to address this issue. We have elaborated a research design that promises to provide the sort of evidence that can solve some of the impasses of the current literature and lead to a thorough characterization of the folk metaphysics of free action and moral responsibility.
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